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MONEYFOR NOTHING: FIVE SMALL STEPS TO
BEGIN THE LONG JOURNEY OF RESTORING
INTEGRITY TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S DISABILITY PROGRAMS
Judge Drew A. Swank*

I.

FROM THE BEGINNINGI: AN INTRODUCTION

The population of the United States grew by 9.7% from the years
2000 to 2010.2 During the same period, the number of disability
applications filed with the Social Security Administration (the
"Agency") grew by 230%-over 25 times the growth of the country's
population. Why? During those ten years there was Hurricane Katrina
and other storms, tomados, and floods. Other decades, however, have
also had severe weather that caused deaths, injuries, and losses. There
were the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq in which our service members continue to
courageously fight. There has not been, however, any pandemic or other
* Judge Drew A. Swank is a graduate of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College
of William and Mary and is a member of the Virginia Bar. A retired U.S. Army judge advocate and
combat veteran, he has worked for both the Attorney General and Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth of Virginia. From 2006 to 2012, he served as a Social Security administrative law
judge adjudicating disability cases. In 2012, he was competitively selected to serve as an
administrative law judge for the Department of Labor. The views expressed herein do not reflect
those of the Social Security Administration, Department of Labor, or U.S. government.
1. EMERSON, LAKE & PALMER, From the Beginning, on TRILOGY (Atlantic Records 1972).
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 To 2010, at 2 tbl. I
The
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c20lObr-01.pdf.
population of the United States in the year 2000 was 281,421,906. As of 2010, the population of the
United States was 308,745,538. Id.
3. In the year 2000, 1,364,323 disability applications were filed with the Agency. OFFICE OF
RESEARCH, EVALUATION, & STATISTICS, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. No. 13-11827, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 2010, at 142
tbl.59 (2011), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di asr/20l0/di asrl0.pdf. In
2010, 3,161,314 applications for disability benefits were filed. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SUMMARY
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pgm/FY2010SummaryOf
PerfornanceAndFinancialInformation-508Final.pdf.
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mass-disabling event affecting large portions of the United States'
population.
A common explanation for the recent increase in Social Security
disability applications has been the economy's unprecedented sustained
unemployment-the worst since the Great Depression. 4 Unemployed
workers have increasingly given up looking for jobs and instead have
sought Social Security disability payments.5 Since 2009, the number of
people who have signed up for disability benefits is twice the number of
people that have started new jobs. 6 The Congressional Budget Office
attempted to explain this by stating, "[w]hen opportunities for
employment are plentiful, some people who could qualify for [disability]
benefits find working more attractive ...when employment
opportunities are scarce, some of these people participate in the
7
[disability insurance] program instead.",
Social Security disability programs, however, were never designed
to be a safety net for the jobless or a substitute for unemployment
insurance compensation. 8 Furthermore, there is an inherent inconsistency
with the notion that a person can switch back and forth between working
when the economy is good and collecting disability benefits when the

4. See, e.g., Disability Payments: The Elephant in the Waiting-room, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 10, 2011, at 36, 36 [hereinafter Disability Payments]; Damian Paletta, Insolvency
Looms as States Drain U.S. Disability Fund, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 12, 2011, at Al
[hereinafter Paletta, Insolvency Looms]; Lisa Rein, Increase in Claims for Social Security
Clogged by
Denials, WASH.
POST, Mar.
29,
2011,
at
B4;
Press
Release,
Gilda Mehraba, Disability Grp., The SSA's New Methods for Improving the Disability Claim
Backlog (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/8104909.pdf;
Brian Faler,
New
Use
Draining
Social
Security
Disability
Fund,
BOSTON
GLOBE,
May 30, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/05/29/social-security-disabilityinsolvent-unless-congress-votes/wmG61 sP4AUSOEp28oKobJN/story.html;
Russell
Grantham,
Some Gains Made on Social Security Backlog, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 1, 2010,
http://www.aje.com/news/business/some-gains-made-on-social-security-backlog/nQmZh/;
John
Merline, 5.4 Million Join Disability Rolls Under Obama, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY
(Apr. 20, 2012, 8:02 AM), http://news.investors.com/article/608418/201204200802/ssdi-disabilityrolls-skyrocket-under-obama.htm [hereinafter Merline, 5.4 Million Join Disability]; John Merline,
Labor Force Shrinks As Jobless Swell Disability Ranks, INVESTOR'S BuS. DAILY
(May 4, 2012, 9:31 AM) http://news.investors.com/article/610306/201205040931/labor-forceshrinks-as-disability-grows.htm [hereinafter Merline, Labor Force Shrinks].
5. Merline, 5.4 Million Join Disability,supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g.,
Disability Payments, supra note 4, at 36; Paletta, Insolvency Looms,supra note
4, at Al; Rein, supra note 4, at B4; Mehraba, supra note 4; Grantham, supra note 4; Merline, 5.4
Million Join Disability, supra note 4. Since the ultimate question in a Social Security disability
decision is whether or not an individual can work, the fact that many of these individuals are
applying for disability benefits because they had been working but lost theirjob due to the downturn
in the economy, and not their disability, would seem to answer the question as to whether or not
they can work.
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economy is bad. Merely losing a job is not in itself a reason to file for
disability benefits. The Social Security Act (the "Act") 9 defines a
disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
[e.g., work] by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months."'
The ultimate question in an adult Social Security disability case is
whether an individual can work.11 Unless the person loses his or her job
due to a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment" or
develops one subsequent to losing the job, there is no better proof he or
she can work than the fact that they were working. In other words, if a
person with back pain has been working for years and his or her place of
employment closes due to the economy, absent the worsening of the
back problem or a new medical issue, the very best evidence as to
whether the person can work despite his or her back pain is the fact they
had been working for years. With the huge influx of Social Security
disability applications from people who were working and lost their jobs
due to the economy, awards of disability benefits should have
plummeted in the last several years. Instead, they have consistently risen.
Between 2007 and 2010, the number of Social Security disability
benefits awarded has risen 28%.12 The Social Security Administration
claims the rise in the approval rate of disability claims arose from the
hiring of more people to process applications, which in turn expedites
the process. 13 While an increase in staff could explain more cases being
paid, as more cases are being processed overall, it does not logically
explain an increase in the approval rate or percentage of cases being
awarded benefits. Increases in staff or improved efficiency should have
no effect whatsoever on the rate at which disability cases are approved,
but rather should merely result in more cases being processed overall.
Clearly, there must be some other reason for the 28% rise in the approval
rate of Social Security disability cases in just a few years. "More
Americans receive disability benefits than 20 years ago though people
are less likely to have physically demanding jobs, health care has
improved, and the Americans with Disabilities Act bans discrimination
9. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1397mm (2006)).
10.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

11.
12.

Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983).
Disability Payments, supra note 4, at 36; Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Dale D. Glendening, What

We Should Do About Social Security Disability:A Response to RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., REGULATION,

Spring 2012, at 16, 16.
13. See Grantham, supra note 4.
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against the handicapped., 14 Something more than being unemployed is
encouraging individuals to apply for Social Security disability benefits.
Working or not, disabled or not, people are increasingly seeing
Social Security disability benefits as a relatively easy means of earning a
lifetime of government payments, and a gateway to a host of other
government entitlement programs. 15 Because of this, a variety of
commentators have reached the conclusion that the Social Security
Administration's disability programs have become unsustainably
generous. 16 In addition, over the years, Congress and the Social Security
Administration "have gradually expanded the availability of entitlements
to greater and greater numbers of persons." 17 Critics charge that "[t]he
Social Security Act itself and the outdated jurisprudence underlying the
current hearings and appeals system are the problem." 18 Furthermore, the
Social Security Administration leadership, being most concerned about
the ever-growing backlog of disability cases, has prioritized the speed of
processing cases over accuracy. 19 It has become increasingly clear the
Social Security disability programs, instead of only awarding benefits to
adults who are unable to work, is granting benefits to those who can
work-effectively giving away money for nothing.
These problems are not merely academic. In fiscal year 2011, the
Social Security Administration paid over $175 billion in disability
benefits to approximately 15 million recipients. 20 The trust fund that
pays for the Social Security disability programs will exhaust its money
in 2016-only four years away. 2' This situation has led to calls for a
massive overhaul of the Social Security disability programs, ranging
14. Faler, supra note 4.
15.

See Drew A. Swank, Welfare, Income Detection, and the Shadow Economy, 8 RUTGERS

J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 614, 633 (2011) [hereinafter Swank, Welfare]; Drew A. Swank, An Argument
Against Administrative Acquiescence 9-11 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Swank, Administrative Acquiescence]; Merline, 5.4 Million Join DisabilityRolls, supra
note 4.
16. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Should We Do About Social Security DisabilityAppeals?,
REGULATION, Fall 2011, at 34, 34; Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 12, at 22; see also Merline, 5.4

Million Join Disability,supra note 4 (discussing the loosening of Social Security disability rules).
17. Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 12, at 22.
18. Id. at 16.
19.

See Damian Paletta, Disability-BenefitsSystem Faces Review, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2011,

at A8 ("[S]peeding cases through the system has allowed, and in some cases encouraged," disability
benefits to be awarded in cases with less scrutiny.). For a discussion of the Social Security
Administration's backlog of cases, see Drew A. Swank, The Social Security Administration's
Condoning of and Colluding with Attorney Misconduct, 64 ADMIN. L. REv. 508, 517-19 (2012)
[hereinafter Swank, Condoning and Colluding].
20. Securing the Future of the Social Security DisabilityInsurance Program:Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 1 12th Cong. 1 (2012) [hereinafter SSDI Program](statement of

Michael J. Astrue, Comm'r, Social Security Administration).
21. Faler, supra note 4.
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from eliminating entire aspects of the program to fundamentally
changing how disability hearings are conducted. 22 Only by such a top-tobottom review and revision of the Act and the Agency's disability
programs, critics argue, can the integrity be restored to the process.2 3
These are intriguing arguments, worthy of further consideration.
They have just one fundamental flaw: the Congress of the United States.
Massive overhauls of government disability programs require massive
amounts of legislation and Congress has not been able to pass a budget
in years, let alone undertake comprehensive entitlement reform.24
Furthermore, Social Security disability benefits are big business.
Representing Social Security disability claimants is a multi-billion dollar
industry.25 Claimant representatives, who only get paid if their client is
awarded disability benefits, have no incentive to change the system and
kill the proverbial goose that lays the golden egg. 26 Likewise, individuals
who are awarded benefits for which they do not qualify would not want
any changes to the system that benefits them. Members of Congress,
dependent upon campaign donations as much as on votes, are highly
unlikely to advocate for disability program reform, as such efforts could
label them as being against the "disabled. ' '27 Reform efforts, such as
tightening eligibility rules for Social Security disability benefits, have
failed before.2 8
That is why this Article is different. It does not call for a complete
restructuring of the Social Security disability programs which Congress
will not do. As each journey begins with a single step, this Article
advocates five small steps to start the very long journey of restoring the
legitimacy and integrity of the Social Security disability programs, and
in the process, ultimately reducing the growing disability case backlog.
Only one of the five small steps requires any legislative change to the
Social Security Act; the rest merely require following existing
regulations or slight modifications to the current regulations that can be
made by the Social Security Administration. The goal of these five small
22. Pierce, supra note 16, at 39 (recommending, inter alia, eliminating non-exertional
impairments, such as mental illnesses, from being a basis for disability benefits to eliminating
hearings before Social Security administrative law judges); Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 12, at
21 (advocating for an independent administrative law judge corps and formalized "rules of
evidence" and "civil procedure" for use in hearings).
23. See generally Pierce, supranote 16.
24. Where's the Budget? How the Demns Plan to Win, UNION LEADER (Jan. 24, 2012, 7:39
PM), http://www.unionleader.com/article/20120125/OPINION01/701259989/-I /opinion.
25. Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold in U.S. Disability System,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2011, at At.
26. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1720(b)(4) (2012).
27. See Faler, supranote 4.
28. Merline, 5.4 Million Join Disability,supra note 4.
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steps is not to make it harder for individuals to get disability benefits, but
rather to restore integrity to and confidence in the taxpayer-funded
disability programs. Two of the suggested changes involve updating
rules that are over 34 years old. Two of the other suggested changes
advocate merely following existing rules and regulations, which Social
Security Administration leadership has thus far been unwilling to do.
The final suggestion is a regulatory change to remove one of the most
glaring logical and legal inconsistencies of the Social Security disability
programs. While taking these five small steps will not solve all of the
problems with the Social Security disability programs, my solution
demonstrates a willingness to restore at least part of the legitimacy of
taxpayer-funded entitlement programs.

II. "WILL YOU STILL NEED ME, WILL YOU STILL FEED ME,
WHEN I'M SIXTY-FOUR?" 29 : REALIGNING THE AGE CATEGORIES IN THE
MEDICAL-VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES TO MATCH REALITY
In a Social Security adult disability case, the ultimate issue is
determining whether or not an individual can work: either in their
previous job or any other job.3 ° Prior to 1978, the Agency exclusively
used vocational experts to provide evidence of "suitable jobs in the
national economy" which a person with certain physical and/or mental
impairments could perform. 3' Due to inconsistencies in vocational expert
testimony from claimant to claimant, the Social Security Administration
implemented the medical-vocational guidelines in 1978 in an effort to
improve both uniformity and efficiency. 32 The medical-vocational
guidelines consist of a matrix of four factors-physical ability, age,
education, and work experience-which are used to determine eligibility
for disability benefits. 33 The age factor is further subdivided into four
categories: younger individual (age 18 to 49), closely approaching
advanced age (50 to 54), advanced age (55 to 60), and closely
approaching retirement age (over 60). 3 4
Things have changed, however, in the thirty-four years since the
implementation of the medical-vocational guidelines. One change has
been that the full retirement age for Social Security retirement benefits
rose after the implementation of the medical-vocational guidelines from
29. THE BEATLES, When I'm Sixty-Four, on SGT. PEPPER'S LONELY HEARTS CLUB BAND
(Parlophone Records 1967).

30. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458,460 (1983).
31. Id. at461.
32. Id.; see also SSDI Program,supra note 20, at 9-10.
33. Heckler, 461 U.S. at 461-62.
34. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 §§ 201(f)-(h), 203(c) (2012).
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65 years of age to age 67 for individuals born after 1959.35 One of the
reasons Congress cited for this change in the benefits retirement age is
the increase in the average life expectancy. 36 In 1978, when the medicalvocational guidelines were implemented, the average life expectancy in
the United States was 73.5 years of age.37 By 2012, the average life
expectancy in the United States had risen to 78.7-over five years more
than the average in 1978.38 Another change in addition to a higher full
Social Security retirement age and longer life expectancy has been the
fact that people have begun working longer into old age.39 While
individuals polled in 1996 expected to retire at age 60, by 2012 the
expected retirement age of individuals polled had increased to age 67.40
One thing that has not changed, however, is the age categories of
the medical-vocational guidelines despite the fact Americans live longer,
work longer, and collect Social Security retirement benefits later. At the
very least, the upper age in each category should be increased two years
to match the increase in the retirement age for individuals born after
1960. More realistically, given the increase in life expectancy and the
age at which individuals expect to retire, the age in each category for all
individuals should be increased five years: younger individual (age 18 to
54), closely approaching advanced age (55 to 59), advanced age (60 to
64), and closely approaching retirement age (over 65). The medicalvocational guidelines were not written in stone; they need to evolve as
lifespans change. The purpose of such a change is not to increase or
decrease the likelihood of any one individual receiving disability
benefits, but rather to have the medical-vocational guidelines reflect the
reality of today, and not the reality of over three decades ago.
The age categories used in the medical-vocational guidelines are a
construct of the Social Security Administration; they are not specified in
the Social Security Act passed by Congress. 4 1 No legislation would be
35. Retirement Age Calculator, SOC. SECURITy ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/age
increase.htm (last updated June 6, 2012).
36. Id.
37. Life Expectancy - United States, DATA360, http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_
SetGroupId=195 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
38. Id.
39. Alicia Munnell, 8 Reasons Older People Are Working Longer, MSN MONEY (Aug. 12,
2011, 7:45 AM), http://money.msn.com/retirement/article.aspx?post--11024ee3-c635-4d6d-9f2d336f5b850247; see also Andrea Orr, Americans Work Longer, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.epi.org/publication/americanswork longer.
40. Allison Linn, Americans Expect to Work Longer, Retire Later, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://lifeinc.today.com/_news/2012/04/30/11433757-americans-expect-to-worklonger-retire-later.
41. Compare 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 § 200(a) (detailing the medical-vocational
guidelines), with Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41:155

required to change them beyond the Commissioner issuing a
modification to the existing regulations.42 Criticism of the medicalvocational guidelines age categories is not new; over a decade ago it was
suggested the Agency extend the definition of "advanced age" to age
60.4' Given the additional passage of time since that argument was made,
modifying the various age categories in the medical-vocational
guidelines is long overdue.
III. "You DON'T UNDERSTAND ME" 44 :
ELIMINATING ENGLISH LANGUAGE ABILITY AS A
FACTOR OF THE MEDICAL-VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES

The age categories of the medical-vocational guidelines are not the
only factor that is outdated. An individual's ability to communicate in
English is included in the medical-vocational guidelines as a vocational
factor.45 "Because English is the dominant language of the country, it
may be difficult for someone who doesn't speak and understand English
to do a job, regardless of the amount of education the person may have
in another language. 46 Accordingly, the claimant's ability to
communicate in English is considered when determining what work, if
any, he or she can do.47 For example, an individual who knows enough
English to communicate as a hotel maid may not be able to communicate
in English for purposes of other jobs.48 As stated in the Social Security
regulations:
While illiteracy or the inability to communicate in English may
significantly limit an individual's vocational scope, the primary work
functions in the bulk of the unskilled work relate to working with
things (rather than data or people) and in these work functions at the
unskilled level, literacy and ability to communicate in English has the
least significance. Similarly the lack of relevant work experience

U.S.C. §§ 301-1397mm (2006)) (making no mention of medical-vocational guidelines as part of the
Social Security Act).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(5).
43. Hon. John Marshall Meisburg, Jr., Ten Ways to Improve the Social Security Disability
Law andSave Billions of Dollars,FED. LAW., May 2000, at 38, 40.
44.

THE RACONTEURS, You Don 't Understand Me, on CONSOLERS OF THE LONELY (Third

Man Records 2005).
45. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(b)(5), 416.964(b)(5) (2012); see Kathleen Pickering, Note, Social
Security DisabilityDeterminations: The Use and Abuse of the GridSystem, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575,
589 (1983).
46. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(b)(5), 416.964(b)(5); see Pickering, supra note 45, at 609.
47. 20 C.F.R. 9§ 404.1564(b)(5), 416.964(b)(5).
48. Pickering, supra note 45, at 609 (citing Minuto v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 525
F. Supp. 261, 265-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
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would have little significance since the bulk of unskilled jobs require

no qualifying work experience. Thus, the functional capability for a
full range of sedentary work represents sufficient numbers of jobs to
indicate substantial vocational scope for those individuals ae 18-44
in English.
even if they are illiterate or unable to communicate

What is interesting is that the Social Security Administration
merely asks the individual if they are able to speak or understand
English; there is no burden of proof placed on the individual to
demonstrate an inability to communicate in English. 50 At least in certain
circumstances, a claimant asserting an inability to communicate in
English increases his or her likelihood to receive disability benefits
under the medical-vocational guidelines circumstances as compared to
an individual with the same impairments who can communicate in
English. 51 At the sedentary exertion level of work, 52 the inability to
communicate in English only benefits claimants who have either no
work experience or merely unskilled work experience who are between
the ages of 45 to 49.53 At the light exertion level of work,54 the inability
to communicate in English only benefits claimants who have either no
work experience or merely unskilled work experience who are under the
age of 5 5. At all other exertion levels and age categories, the ability to
communicate in English is not an enumerated factor of the medicalvocational guidelines.
But is the issue of English language ability as relevant in
contemporary America as when the medical-vocational guidelines were
introduced? Just as people are living longer and retiring later, the
demographics of the United States have undergone a dramatic
transformation since 1978. From 1980 to 2007, the percentage of
individuals in the United States predominantly speaking a language other
than English has grown by 140%, while the nation's overall population
49. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 app. 2, § 201(h)(4)(i).
50. See, e.g., GN 00203.011 Special Interviewing Situations: Limited English Proficiency
(LEP) or Language Assistance Required, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/appsl0f
poms.nsf/Inx/0200203011 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013); DI 11005.023 Completing the Disability
Report Adult Form SSA-3368, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/appsl0/poms.nsf/
lnx/0411005023 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
51. Pickering, supra note 45, at 609.
52. In the medical-vocational guidelines, sedentary work is defined as that work generally
requiring lifting less than ten pounds and requires two hours or less of standing or walking and six
hours or more of sitting. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.
53. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 tbl.1.
54. In the medical-vocational guidelines, light work is defined as that work generally
requiring lifting up to twenty pounds occasionally and up to ten pounds frequently and requires six
hours or more of standing or walking and two hours or less of sitting. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.
55. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 tbl.2.
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only grew by 34%.56 The number of people age 5 and older who speak a
language other than English at home has more than doubled in the last
three decades and grew at a pace four times greater than the nation's
population growth-now totaling 20% of the population.57 The use of
Spanish as the predominant language in the home has risen the fastest in
the United States; from 1980 to 2007 its use rose by 21 1%.58 The longer
a non-English speaker resides in the United States, the more likely they
will communicate in English regularly, with 75% doing so after ten to
fifteen years in the United States.59
While the age categories used in the medical-vocational guidelines
are not mentioned in the Act, English language ability is specifically
addressed in two different parts of the Act. The first reference, found at
6
42 U.S.C. § 423(f), relates to tenninating Title II disability benefits. 1
The "lack of facility with the English language" is a factor the Agency
must consider along with the physical, mental, and educational
limitations of a claimant when terminating his or her disability benefits.6'
The second reference, found at 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(1)(A), relates to
granting Title XVI disability benefits. That provision of the Act, just as
with the Title II provision, states the Agency will take into account a
claimant's "physical, mental, educational, or linguistic limitation of such
individual (including any lack of facility with the English language) in
determining" the award of disability benefits. 62 Because these references
to English language competency are in the actual Social Security Act,
legislation would be required to remove them. The purpose of the
change, as with changing the age categories of the medical-vocational
guidelines, is not to make it more or less likely that a claimant receive
disability benefits, but rather to make the factors considered in the
disability adjudication process reflect the America of today and how it
has changed since 1978.
As a pragmatic matter, the inability to speak or understand English
while trying to find a job could certainly make it more difficult. By the
56. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, New Census Bureau Report Analyzes Nation's
Linguistic Diversity (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
americancommunitysurveryacs/cbl 0-cn58.html.
57.

Id.; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING ABILITY:

2000, at 2 (Oct. 2003), availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf.
58. Charlie Jolly, Number of Non-English-Speaking Households Rises in the US, K-INT'L
(May 27, 2012), http://www.k-intemational.com/blog/non-english-speakers-in-us.
59. Stina Santiestevan, Use of the Spanish Language in the United States: Trends, Challenges,
andOpportunities,ERIC DIGS. (May 1991), http://www.ericdigests.org/pre-9221/spanish.htm.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 423(0 (2006). For a discussion of the types of Social Security disability
programs, see Swank, Welfare, supra note 15, at 618-19.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 423(0.
62. Id. § 1383(c)(1)(A).
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same token, having a felony conviction, being unattractive, or living in
Detroit can all make it more difficult to find a job.63 At least one
commentator has even claimed the inability to communicate in English
may itself be a non-exertional impairment-a disability.64 The Social
Security Act, however, defines a disability as an "inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity [e.g., work] by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months. 65 Utilizing this definition,
the test to determine if an individual qualifies for Social Security
disability benefits is by deciding if the claimant's:
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding
sentence (with respect to any individual), "work which exists in the
national economy" means work which exists in significant numbers
either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of
the country. 66
Furthermore, a "'physical or mental impairment' is an impairment
that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques., 67 The inability to communicate in
English would not qualify under these definitions as a "disability" unless
the individual had a mental or physical impairment that prevented
communication in any language, and not just English. Twelve years ago
the argument was raised to abolish the inability to communicate in
English as a factor in awarding disability benefits.6 8 Since then, the
number of non-English speaking workers in the United States has
63. See Jamie Barrand, Felony Records Make Job Hunt Difficult, J. REV. (Apr. 27, 2011, 1:15
AM), http://www.joumalreview.com/news/article_063933ae-706e-l leO-9750-001cc4c03286.html;
Marty Nemko, Working While Ugly: Career Advice for the Unattractive, JEWISH WORLD REV.
(May 25, 2006), http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0506/nemko052506.php3; John Zaphyr, Worst
Cities in the U.S. to Find a Job, EHoW, http://www.ehow.com/print/info_7931810_worst-citiesjob.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
64. Pickering, supra note 45, at 609.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
66. Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
67. Id. § 423(d)(3).
68. Meisburg, supra note 43, at 42, 44.
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dramatically increased. Just as with the arguments for realigning age
categories in the medical-vocational guidelines, the argument for
eliminating considerations of linguistic abilities from the adjudication of
disability benefit awards is even stronger a decade later.
IV. "EVERY BREATH You TAKE, EVERY MOVE YOU MAKE,
EVERY BOND You BREAK, EVERY STEP You TAKE, I'LL BE WATCHING
YoU" 69 : THE FAILURE OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION TO
Do MANDATORY CONTINUING DISABILITY REVIEWS

The Act provides a mechanism to ensure that the approximately

fifteen million current disability benefit recipients continue to be eligible
to receive their benefits.70 A Continuing Disability Review is "a review

of continued eligibility for disability benefits previously awarded" by the
Social Security Administration.7 ' The Act requires Continuing Disability
Reviews of all beneficiaries with nonpermanent impairments at least
once every three years. 72 This three-year review requirement also applies
to children receiving disability benefits whose impairments are likely to
improve.73 Additionally, if there are earnings reported for the individual

above substantial-gainful activity levels, a Continuing Disability Review
must be conducted.74 For a small investment of administrative resources,
Continuing Disability Reviews save billions of taxpayer dollars.75 For

each dollar spent on a Continuing Disability Review, an average of $15
in improperly paid benefits is saved.76

69. THE POLICE, Every Breath You Take, on SYNCHRONICITY (A & M Records 1983).
70. See SSDI Program,supra note 20, at 1.
71. Social Security's Payment Accuracy: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight& Social Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 3 (2011)
[hereinafter Statement of Ann P. Robert] (statement of Ann P. Robert, President Elect,
National
Council
of
Disability
Determination
Directors),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/robert222.pdf; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
SOc. SEC. ADMIN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: OCTOBER 1,2009-MARCH 31, 2010, at 22

(March 2010) [hereinafter SEMIANNUAL REPORT], available at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/
semiannual/sar 102009032010_0.pdf.
72. Statement of Ann P. Robert, supra note 71, at 3 (citing sections 221(i) and 1614(a)(3) of
the Social Security Act).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(ii) (2006).
74. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FOLLOW-UP ON DISABLED TITLE II
BENEFICIARIES WITH EARNINGS REPORTED ON THE MASTER EARNING FILE 2 & n.10 (April 15,
2009) [hereinafter TITLE II BENEFICIARIES AUDIT] (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1590(b)(5) (2012)),
availableat http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-01-08-28075.pdf.
75. Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 112th Cong. 11 (2012) [hereinafter Hearing Before
Fin. Comm.] (statement of Michael J. Astrue, Comm'r, Social Security Administration), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SSA-%/20Testimony- /2OAstrue-FINAL.pdf.
76. TITLE II BENEFICIARIES AUDIT, supra note 74, at 7 & n.25.
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Unfortunately, the Agency does not conduct Continuing Disability
Reviews as required by the Act, despite, for example, the proven
effectiveness of Childhood Continuing Disability Reviews (the Agency
conducted 4440 reviews in fiscal year 2007 compared with 163,768 in
2002). 7 In a 2006 audit conducted by the Agency's Office of Inspector
General, 39% of these Childhood Continuing Disability Reviews were
not conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Act. 78 The
failure to conduct the Childhood Continuing Disability Reviews resulted
in $194.7 million in disability payments to 205,900 individuals that
should not have been paid.79 Because of its failure to comply with the
specific requirements of the Act, the Agency agreed to perform all
Childhood Continuing Disability Reviews as mandated in the statute.8"
Five years later, the Agency did not complete 78.5% of the required
Childhood Continuing Disability Reviews as required by the Act-two
times worse than in 2006.81 The failure to conduct these Childhood
Continuing Disability Reviews resulted in $1.4 billion in disability
payments-seven times the 2006 amount-to approximately 513,300
recipients who should not have been paid, and will continue to cost
approximately $462 million per year in improper disability payments
until the reviews are conducted.8 2 Even though five years earlier the
Agency agreed to comply with the requirements of the Act and conduct
appropriate Childhood Continuing Disability Reviews, the Agency in
2011 asserted that "budget constraints and other priority workloads"
continue to be responsible for its failure to comply with the specific
requirements imposed upon it by the statute, but that it hopes to comply
"as its budget and other priority workloads will allow.",8 3 There is,
however, no provision in the Act that allows the Agency to ignore the
specific requirement to conduct Childhood Continuing Disability
Reviews because of "other priority workloads. 8 4 Instead, the Agency
seems to have determined when it will, and will not, comply with the
specific requirements of the Act. Its legal basis for doing so is unknown.
77. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FOLLOW-UP: CHILDHOOD CONTINUING
DISABILITY REVIEWS AND AGE 18 REDETERMINATIONS 7 tbl.5 (2011) [hereinafter CHILDHOOD
CONTINUING DISABILITY AUDIT], available at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-

01-11-11118_0.pdf.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 3 tbl.1. Of the 78.5% of the childhood continuing disability reviews not done in
accordance with the Act, 93% were never done and 7% were late. Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Id. at 8.
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(ii) (2006); CHILDHOOD CONTINUING DISABILITY AUDIT,
supra note 77, at 8.
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The "budgetary constraints" excuse of the Agency is particularly
interesting. Since fiscal year 2009, the Agency has requested and
received from Congress special additional funding solely for the purpose
of conducting Continuing Disability Reviews. Despite the Agency
receiving over 1.2 billion additional dollars for this purpose since 2009,
the current number of Continuing Disability Reviews is nowhere near
the level in fiscal year 2003 when the Agency received no additional
funding. 86 In fiscal year 2010, with the additional funding, the Agency
conducted almost eight times fewer Childhood Continuing Disability
Reviews as compared to the number conducted in fiscal year 2003when there was no additional funding.8 7 With over a billion more dollars
given to the Agency specifically to do Continuing Disability Reviews, it
conducted 87% fewer Childhood Continuing Disability Reviews than
when it was not given any additional money. Childhood Continuing
Disability Reviews are not the only types of reviews that have decreased
with the additional funding; the number of adult medical Continuing
Disability Reviews for both Title II and adult Title XVI recipients in
fiscal year 2010 was only 47% of the number completed in fiscal year
2004-when there was no additional funding. 88 Had these reviews been
performed as required by the Social Security Act, between $1.3 billion
and $2.6 billion in improper payments could have been saved. 89
Given the inverse results, "budgetary constraints" does not seem to
be the real reason for the Agency's failure to abide by the Act and
conduct the required Continuing Disability Reviews. If the Agency is not
doing Continuing Disability Reviews due to "budgetary constraints,"
then the sole remaining reason is its emphasis on "other priority
workloads." 90 According to the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration, eliminating the backlog of disability cases awaiting a
hearing is the Agency's top priority. 9' In fiscal year 2011, the Social
Security Administration received approximately 877,000 hearing

85.
86.
87.
Reviews.
88.

CHILDHOOD CONTINUING DISABILITY AUDIT, supra note 77, at 6 & tbl.4.

Id. at 6 & tbl.4, 7 tbl.5.
Id. at 7 tbl.5. In fiscal year 2010, the Agency conducted 16,677 Childhood Disability
In fiscal year 2003, it had conducted 127,444. Id.
See Hearing Before Fin. Comm., supra note 75, at 12 tbl.l.

89. SEMIANNUAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 22.
CHILDHOOD CONTINUING DISABILITY AUDIT, supra note 77, at 5.
91. HearingBefore Fin. Comm., supranote 75, at 3; SSDI Program,supra note 20, at 18; see,
e.g., Damian Paletta, Disability-ClaimJudge Has Trouble Saying "No": Near-Perfect Approval
Record,-Social-Security ProgramStrained, WALL ST. J., MAY 19, 2011, at Al [hereinafter Paletta,
Disability-Claim Judge]; Amy Reifenrath, Cheaters Cost Social Security Billions, OREGONIAN
(Dec. 6, 2008, 8:36 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.ssf/2008/12/disability_
fraud saps social s.html.
90.
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requests, about 22% more than it received in fiscal year 2010.92 Congress
has consistently investigated, criticized, and publicly chastised the
Agency for this backlog. 93 In response to this criticism, the Agency has
repeatedly stated the elimination of the backlog-and the source of
public and congressional disapproval-is its top priority.94
The fact the Social Security Administration does not want anything
to impede the quick processing of the backlogged cases has previously
been exposed to both Congress and the media. 95 Conducting Continuing
Disability Reviews, irrespective of their requirement in the Act, takes
administrative, personnel, and monetary resources away from the
foremost goal of eliminating the hearing backlog. Even worse,
conducting Continuing Disability Reviews actually makes the hearing
backlog grow. If claimants' benefits are terminated due to a Continuing
Disability Review, they can always file a new application for benefits.
The new application for disability benefits will need to be processed and
decided like any other disability case, and if it goes to a hearing, it adds
to the backlog. As there is no limit to how many applications a person
may file and there is no cost to the person to do so, there is no reason
why a person whose benefits have been terminated due to a Continuing
Disability Review would not file a new application. 96 With each new
application for disability benefits that is filed, whether resulting from a
Continuing Disability Review or not, the backlog grows. Of course, if no
Continuing Disability Review is ever conducted, more taxpayer money
will continue to be improperly spent.9 7
92.
93.

HearingBefore Fin. Comm., supra note 75, at 5; Rein, supranote 4, at B4.
See, e.g., U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-667T, SOCIAL SECURITY

DISABILITY: MANAGEMENT OF DISABILITY CLAIMS WORKLOAD WILL REQUIRE COMPREHENSIVE

PLANNING 4 (2010) (statement of Daniel Bertoni, Director of Education, Workforce,
and Income Security); Ed Madrid, Benefits Backlog Swells as Social Security Slims,
OREGONIAN (Aug. 4, 2008, 3:35 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/special/index.ssf/2008/08/
benefits backlog swells assoc.html.
94. See, e.g., Funding Social Security's Administrative Costs: Will the Budget Meet the
Mission: Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Michael J. Astrue,
Comm'r of Social Security Administration); Press Release, Soc. Sec. Admin., Social Security
Administration Attacks Disability Backlog (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/
disability-backlog-pr.htm.
95. Paletta, Disabili,-Claim Judge, supra note 91. "Critics blame the Social Security
Administration, which oversees the disability program, charging that it is more interested in clearing
the giant backlog than ensuring deserving candidates get benefits." Id.
96. Beginning July 28, 2011, a claimant who has a claim pending in the Agency's
administrative review process may not file a new claim of the same benefit type until the previous
claim is adjudicated. There is no prohibition on filing a different type of claim (for instance, filing a
Title XVI claim if there is already a Title II claim) nor any limit on the total number of claims that
may be filed during a person's lifetime. Titles I1and XVI: Procedures for Handling Requests to File
Subsequent Applications for Disability Benefits, 76 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 28, 2011).
97. As opposed to a private insurer, because someone else pays the bills (e.g., the taxpayer),
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Unlike the other four suggestions in this Article to restore the
integrity to the Social Security disability process, conducting Continuing
Disability Reviews requires no statutory or regulatory changes. The Act
already requires the Agency to conduct a variety of Continuing
Disability Reviews. All that is needed is for the Agency to do what it is
required to do, what it has stated it must do, and what it has been given
extra money to do. Unfortunately, because these reviews do not reduce
the backlog, the Social Security Administration is unlikely to ever
conduct Continuing Disability Reviews as required.
V. "TELL ME EVERYTHING"98: INTENTIONALLY CONCEALING
ADVERSE MEDICAL AND VOCATIONAL INFORMATION AND FRAUD

The Social Security Administration's disability hearings are nonadversarial in which the government is not represented. 99 There is no
opposing party at the hearing to introduce evidence contrary to the
application for disability benefits. The Agency relies on the claimant and
his or her representative for information on which health care providers
the claimant has seen.100 This disparity of knowledge creates a huge
potential problem, as the claimant, and/or his or her representative, can
be selective as to what medical or vocational evidence is submitted at the
hearing. 10 1 As the average claimant's lifetime award is over $300,000
and the representative being paid either 25% of the back benefits (or
$6000, whichever is less) only if the claimant is awarded benefits, there
is a strong incentive for both the representative and the claimant to not
02
disclose adverse vocational or medical information to the Agency.
there is no incentive for the Social Security Administration to keep the number of cases paid low.
See Paletta, Insolvency Looms, supra note 4, at A16 (discussing the common belief of claimants'
that "big, rich Uncle Sam's money" pays for their Social Security disability benefits where in reality
it is the American taxpayer).
98. CHEAP TRICK, Tell Me Everything, on WOKE UP WITH AMONSTER (Warner Bros. Records
1994).
99. See Robert E. Rains, ProfessionalResponsibility and Social Security Representation: The
Myth of the State-Bar Bar to Compliance with FederalRules on Production ofAdverse Evidence, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 363, 364 (2007); Swank, Administrative Acquiescence, supra note 15, at 12-13.
SECURITY ADMIN.,
100. DI 2250.006 Requesting Evidence - General, SOC.
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0422505006 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (discussing how that the
Social Security Administration employees should develop the evidence in the case file from all
sources identified by the claimant or that can be discovered from the records of the health care
providers identified by the claimant).
101. Rains, supra note 99, at 364.
102. Paletta, Insolvency Looms, supra note 4, at A16. The $300,000 amount is merely for the
average of Social Security disability benefits, and not the total amount, which could include
additional government benefits that can become available-such as Medicaid-with a grant of
Social Security benefits. See Maximum Dollar Limit in the Fee Agreement Process, 74 Fed. Reg.
6080, 6080 (Feb. 4, 2009); Paletta & Searcey, supra note 25, at A16.
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Companies that specialize in representing Social Security disability
applicants have allegedly even institutionalized the process of
withholding any information that 10
might
make it more difficult for their
3
client-and their firm-to be paid.
The purpose of a Social Security Act, however, is to provide
assistance for those who cannot work due to a medically determinable
impairment. 0 4 Just as with any other welfare program, the goal is to
determine eligibility for benefits. 05 The only way to do this is to
consider all of the medical and vocational information, not just the
favorable information. The goal of the Social Security disability
programs should not be to reward those who cheat or hide evidence the
most successfully. 0 6 At least one commentator has concluded that Social
Security representatives have a duty to disclose adverse information. In
Professional Responsibility and Social Security Representation: The
Myth of the State-Bar Bar to Compliance with Federal Rules on
Production of Evidence,10 7 Professor Robert Rains examines and
ultimately rejects the arguments against disclosure of all evidence by
Social Security claimant representatives.' 0 8 Tracing a series of federal
statutes, he concludes that the Social Security Protection Act of 2004
(the "Protection Act") 0 9 mandates full disclosure of all evidence-good
and bad-by claimant's representatives and trumps any state bar ethics
rules. 1 0 The provisions of the Protection Act have been incorporated
into the Social Security Act, and provide for a five-year felony sentence
for making or causing to be made "any false statement or representation
of a material fact in any application for any payment" for disability
benefits."' Furthermore, the Protection Act permits the Social Security
Administration to impose monetary penalties for failing to disclose
1 12
material facts relevant to the determination to grant disability benefits.

103. Paletta&Searcey, supra note 25, at A16. In 2011, one company that supposedly
withholds medical information from the Social Security Administration received $88 million in fees,
more than any other disability representative company. Id.
104. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983).
105. See generally Swank, Welfare, supra note 15.
106. Seeid. at639.
107. Rains, supra note 99.
108. Id. at390-91.
109. Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493, 493-541
(2004) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.).
110. Rains, supra note 99, at 391-94.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006); see also U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-849,
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME: PROGRESS MADE IN DETECTING AND RECOVERING
OVERPAYMENTS, BUT MANAGEMENT ATTENTION SHOULD CONTINUE 13 (2002), available at

http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/235391.pdf.
112. Rains, supra note 99, at 377.
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The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration delegated
13
this sanction power to the Agency's Office of the Inspector General.'
The Social Security Act also allows for the Commissioner to
suspend or disqualify a claimant representative who refuses to comply
with the Agency's rules and regulations.1 14 The Code of Federal
Regulations, mirroring the Act, forbids making or participating in the
making of false or misleading statements, assertions, or representations
regarding a material fact or law, with claimant representatives who do so
liable to suspension or disqualification from serving as a
representative. 115 Additionally, both the Social Security Administration's
hearing manual and policy manual reiterate these same requirements and
likewise provide for the suspension or disqualification of representatives
who violate "the affirmative duties of a representative or engaged in
actions prohibited by the Commissioner's rules and regulations."" 16 The
Agency's Office of General Counsel is responsible for issues of
representative suspension or disqualification. 1 7 However, Social
Security administrative law judges, attorneys, and staff are prohibited by
Agency policy from reporting representative misconduct to anyone other
than agency management-a ban which includes reporting the suspected
misconduct to the representative's state bar or the Agency's own Office
of the Inspector General or Office of General Counsel." 18 If any action is
to be taken, it is up to management to forward it to the Office of General
Counsel for investigation." 9
Unfortunately, the Agency has a very poor record of sanctioning
representative misconduct.12 0 On average, each year 5.56 of the
estimated total 31,000 attorney and non-attorney representatives-or

113. Id. at 378.
114.

42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1).

115. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1740(c)(3), 404.1745, 416.1540(c)(3), 416.1545 (2012).
116. See OFFICE OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION & REVIEW, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., HALLEX:
HEARINGS, APPEALS AND LITIGATION LAW MANUAL § I-1-1-40 (2011), available at http://ssa.gov/

OP Home/hallex/l-01/I-1-1-40.html; GN 03970.010 Rules of Conduct and Standards of
Responsibility for Representatives, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/appsI0/poms.nsf/
1nx/0203970010 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
117. OFFICE OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION & REVIEW, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., HALLEX:
HEARINGS, APPEALS AND LITIGATION LAW MANUAL § 1-1-1-50(B) (2011), available at

http://ssa.gov/OP Home/hallex/I-0 1/1- 1-1-50.html.
118. Id. § 1-1-1-50(A) (requiring any staff person who observed or detected suspected
violations of the rules pertaining to a representative's conduct to provide that information to their
office management).
119. Id.§ I-1-1-50(A)(4).
120. Swank, Conditioning and Colluding, supra note 19, at 519; Drew A. Swank, NonAttorney Social Security Disability Representatives and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 36
S. ILL. U. L.J. 223,242 (2012).
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.018%-are suspended or disqualified by the Agency. 12 1 "The average
number of attorneys (as opposed to non-attorneys) suspended or
disqualified each year by the Agency is 2.4, or .009% of the estimated
total number of attorney representatives. ' ' 122 This percentage of
suspended or disqualified attorneys is sixteen times less than the number
of attorneys disbarred in an average year in either Georgia or
Maryland.123 Considering that disbarment or other punishment by a state
bar has been historically very rare, the fact that the Agency does the
12 4
equivalent sixteen times fewer than state bars is incredible.
Furthermore, the few attorneys the Agency suspends or disqualifies each
year have normally already been disbarred-and in some cases
convicted of a crime and even incarcerated-prior to the Agency taking
any action. 25 Because of management's refusal to take misconduct
seriously, the laws intended to prohibit concealing or misrepresenting
adverse material facts are rendered meaningless.
Accordingly, the commissioner of the Social Security
Administration should modify the regulations and additionally delegate
to the administrative law judges who preside over the disability hearings
121.

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., CLAIMANT REPRESENTATIVES
1 n.3 (Sept. 28,

BARRED FROM PRACTICING BEFORE THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

2007), available at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-12-07-17057.pdf, Swank,
Condoning and Colluding, supra note 19, at 519-20. Attorneys represent 63% of Social Security
disability claimants, 11%are represented by non-attorneys, and the remaining 26% of claimants are
pro se. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR NON-

ATTORNEY REPRESENTATIVES 3 (June 5, 2006), available at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/
audit/full/pdf/A- 12-06-16013.pdf; Swank, Condoning and Colluding, supra note 19, at 519-20; see
also Rains, supra note 99, at 370.
122. Swank, Condoningand Colluding, supra note 19, at 520.
123.

See, e.g., THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMM'N OF MD., 33RD ANNUAL REPORT: JULY 1,

2007 THRU JUNE 30, 2008, at 4-13, available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/attygrievance/
pdfs/annualreport.pdf (demonstrating that in Maryland in fiscal year 2008, 45 of the approximately
33,400 attorneys in the state were disbarred or suspended, or 0.13%); BD. OF GOVERNORS, STATE
BAR OF GA., 2010 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 9 (2010), available at

http://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalis/upload/OGCReport_09_10.pdf. Fifty-nine
attorneys were either disbarred or suspended out of a total of 36,500 (or 0.16%). BD. OF
GOVERNORS, supra;Swank, Condoningand Colluding, supra note 19, at 520 & n.74.
124. Derek A. Denckla, Responses to the Conference: Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and EthicalParameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581,
2594 (1999) (suggesting that studies of the lawyer discipline system demonstrate that lawyers rarely
suffer any consequences for incompetence or other failings); see also National Affairs: Disbarred,
TIME, Nov. 27, 1939, at 15 (demonstrating that this observation had been previously made over
seventy years ago).
125. Of those attorneys suspended or disqualified by the Social Security Administration, the
majority were already sanctioned by their own state bar, and the Agency's disciplinary action was
merely to prohibit those individuals from representing claimants before it based on the action of
their respective state bar, and not because the agency had pursued its own misconduct investigations
regarding the conduct of those attorneys. AALJ Education Conference: Labor Management Meeting,
NEWSL. & PRESIDENT'S REP. (Ass'n Admin. Law Judges), June 13, 2011, at 8-9.
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the authority to ensure that all material evidence is submitted to the
Agency. 126 Social Security administrative law judges are unusual in that
they have no authority to sanction misconduct. Other federal agencies'
administrative law judges are routinely allowed to sanction
representative misconduct. For example, administrative law judges with
the International Trade Commission are authorized to impose monetary
127
penalties and non-monetary sanctions for representative misconduct.
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Labor administrative law
judges can discharge representatives from cases for misconduct. 28
Federal Trade Commission, Department of Labor, and International
Trade Commission administrative law judges are selected and appointed
from the same pool as Social Security administrative law judges.1 29 For
some reason, while these agencies authorize their administrative law
judges to sanction representatives who appear before them for
misconduct, the Social Security administrative law judges are only
allowed to report misconduct to Agency management.
Just as with actually performing the Continuing Disability Reviews,
however, there is almost no likelihood the Agency will either enforce the
requirement that all evidence be submitted to it or authorize its
administrative law judges to sanction representatives' failure to do so, as
neither would be perceived as means of reducing the backlog of
disability hearings. As the requirement to submit adverse evidence is
never enforced, there is no need for claimants' representatives to comply
with the requirement. As the available evidence demonstrates that Social
Security claimant representatives are no more ethical than any other type
of attorney, and regardless of the requirement to produce adverse
evidence, some Social Security disability claims will not be adjudicated
on their merits, but will rather be decided by deceit and falsehood to the
detriment of both the taxpayer and the truly disabled. 30

126. See 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(5) (2006).
127. 19 C.F.R. § 210.4(d) (2012).
128. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(d) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 18.36(b) (2012).
129. See5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006).
130. Swank, Condoning and Colluding, supra note 19, at 520 & n.77; Swank, Welfare, supra
note 15, at 638-41.
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"WELL I'VE BEEN LOoKIN' REAL HARD, AND I'M TRYIN' To FIND
A JOB, BUT IT JUST KEEPS GETTIN' TOUGHER EVERY DAY"I 31:
THE INCONSISTENCY OF RECEIVING STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE COMPENSATION WHILE SEEKING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY BENEFITS

F. Scott Fitzgerald was quoted as saying, "[t]he test of a first-rate
intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same
time and still retain the ability to function., 132 Psychologists refer to this
phenomenon of attempting to reconcile two conflicting ideas as
cognitive dissonance. 3 3 Whether by genius or psychosis, many Social
Security disability claimants applying for benefits due to an alleged
inability to work are at the same time already collecting state
unemployment compensation benefits by asserting they are able to work.
Both assertions--one made to the federal government that the person is
unable to work while at the very same time asserting to a state
government that they can work-cannot be true.
When a person applies for Social Security disability benefits, he or
she is asserting that due to "medically determinable physical or mental
impairment[s]," he or she is unable to work for at least twelve months
either in his or her past jobs or, considering his or her age, education,
and work experience, any other jobs at substantial gainful activity
levels. 134 This assertion is time specific; there is a specific alleged onset
of disability date.13 5 The problem arises when a person collects
unemployment benefits for a period of time overlapping the alleged
onset of disability date. In all fifty states, a person must certify they are
able to work in order to collect unemployment benefits. 136 A few states,
131. STEVE MILLER BAND, Rock "nMe, on FLY LIKE AN EAGLE (Capitol Records 1976).
132. F. Scott Fitzgerald Biography, BIOGRAPHYBASE.COM, http://www.biographybase.com/
biography/Fitzgerald F Scott.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
ABOUT.COM,
Dissonance?,
Is
Cognitive
What
Cherry,
133. Kendra
http://psychology.about.com/od/cognitivepsychology/f/dissonance.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A) (2006).
135. DI 25501.001 Onset of Disability and Blindness, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
(last visited Feb. 7,
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.NSF/0/dle09a50c224cb678525754c0006ac5b
2013).
136. ALA. CODE § 25-4-77(a)(3) (2007); ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.378(a) (2010); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-771(A) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-507(3)(A) (2012); CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE § 1253(b)-(c) (Deering 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-107(1)(c)() (West 2003);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-235(a)(2) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315(3) (West
2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.091(1)(c)(1) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-195(a)(3)(A)
(2008); HAW.REV. STAT. § 383-29(a)(3) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1366(4)(a) (2012); 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/500(C) (West 2011); IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-4-14-3(b)(1) (West 2012);
IOWA CODE § 96.40(5) (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-705(c) (West 2011); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 341.350(4) (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1600(3)(a) (2011); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1192(3) (2011); MD. CODE ANN., LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT § 8-903(a)(1) (West
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such as Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, and Rhode
Island, go further and actually require the individual be "physically and
mentally able to work" in order to be qualified to collect unemployment
compensation. 137
Receipt of unemployment compensation and any effect on a
contemporaneous application for Social Security disability benefits is not
mentioned in either the Act or the Code of Federal Regulations. Instead,
the Agency has announced its position on receiving unemployment
benefits while also seeking Social Security disability benefits in an
"Adjudication Tip" issued by the Social Security Administration Office
of Disability Adjudication and Review to which the Agency's
administrative law judges are assigned. Issued in April 2012,
"Adjudication Tip #34 - Receipt of Unemployment Benefits" states:
How do you deal with a claimant who is applying for disability but is
receiving unemployment? It is SSA's position that individuals need not
choose between applying for unemployment insurance and Social
Security disability benefits.
The receipt of unemployment benefits is only one of many factors
that must be considered in determining whether the claimant is
disabled. See 20 CFR 404.1512(b) and 416.912(b). Therefore, when
evaluating this issue, look at the underlying circumstances rather than
the mere application for and receipt of benefits. Has the claimant

looked for jobs with physical demands beyond his alleged limitations,
during the alleged period of disability? Has the claimant performed
various mental and physical activities in order to continue receiving

2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15IA, § 24(b) (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 421.28(l)(c) (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.085-1(4) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 71-5-511 (c) (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 288.040-1(2) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3951-2104(b) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-627(3) (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 612.375(1)(c) (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:31-c(l)(b) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 43:21-4(c)(1) (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-5(A)(3) (West 2011); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 591(2) (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 96-13(a)(3) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5206-01(3) (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(A)(4)(a)(i) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 2-205A (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657.155(1)(c) (West 2012); 43 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 801(d)(1) (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-44-12 (West 2011); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-35-110(3) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-6-2(3) (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7302(a)(4) (2012); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.021(a)(3) (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4403(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1457(2) (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 60.2-612(7)(a) (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.20.010(1)(c) (West 2012); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 21A-6-1(3) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(2)(a)(1) (West 2012); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 27-3-306(a)(iii) (2011).
137. ALA. CODE § 25-4-77(a)(3); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-507(3)(A); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-235(a)(2); IND. CODE § 22-4-14-3(b)(1); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.350(4); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-44-12 (specifying "physically" able to work).
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unemployment benefits, such as going on interviews, filling out
applications, etc.? These activities may also be relevant factors when
allegations. 20 CFR
evaluating the credibility of the claimant's
138
404.1529 and 416.929, and SSR 96-7p.
While there is an inherent logical inconsistency of the two
positions-saying to one government agency "I can work so I should
receive money" while at the same time saying to another government
agency "I cannot work so I should receive money"-from a legal
standpoint, there is no bar to applying for both for the same time. The
problem, from a legal perspective, arises upon the receipt of one or the
other benefits. Known in the common law as the Doctrine of the Election
of Remedies, it is "[a] claimant's act of choosing between two or more
concurrent but inconsistent remedies based on a single set of facts.' 1 9
The beginning of the "Adjudication Tip" is therefore completely
accurate; there is no inconsistency in applying for both state
unemployment compensation and Social Security disability benefits; the
inconsistency arises upon receipt of one and then continuing to pursue
the other in violation of the Doctrine of the Election of Remedies. While
the Social Security disability programs are clearly not governed by4
common-law doctrines, the logic of the doctrine is irrefutable. 0
Ultimately, an individual needs to choose his or her remedy for any
given period of time. If the individual chooses to receive unemployment
compensation, it should preclude him or her from collecting Social
Security disability benefits for the same period of time.
As this policy is merely in the "Adjudication Tip," all that would be
needed to preclude collecting both state unemployment compensation
and Social Security disability benefits at the same time would be for the
Commissioner to issue a modification to the existing regulations as
allowed by the Act. 14 1 With such a prohibition, individuals would be free
to pursue both remedies, but limited to accepting only one. This
prohibition would eliminate not only the logical inconsistency of
collecting both state unemployment compensation and Social Security
disability benefits but also the violation of the Doctrine of Election of
Remedies.

138.

Social

Security

Administration,

Office of Disability Adjudication

and Review,

Adjudication Tip # 34 - Receipt of Unemployment Benefits (April 2012) (on file with author).

139. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 558 (8th ed. 2004).
140. See Swank, Administrative Acquiescence, supra note 15, at 13-15.
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(5) (2006).
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"THIS IS THE END" 142 : CONCLUSION

What is the likelihood of the Social Security Administration taking
just one of these five proposed steps? The leadership of the Social
Security Administration would probably not want to institute any of the
proposed changes, because none of them-in the short term at leastwould reduce the backlog of pending disability hearings. In fact, actually
conducting Continuing Disability Reviews, requiring all of the medical
and vocational evidence to be submitted in an application for disability
benefits, and updating age and language factors to represent the United
States of today and not the 1970s, might result in more cases being
denied, absolutely guaranteeing the Agency leadership would not want
to institute any of the proposed changes. Denying disability applications
only leads claimants to appeal or apply for benefits over and over
again-both of which further add to the hearing backlog.
As long as the Agency's goal is merely to process cases as quickly
as possible, preferably awarding benefits so they do not come back as
new applications or appeals, the backlog of disability cases will only
continue to grow. 143 During the "height of the jobs crisis," 117,000
Americans received both Social Security disability and unemployment
benefits.144 "Pay so they go away" has been an unsuccessful strategy in
reducing the hearing backlog, and it will never work. For every
individual improperly awarded disability benefits, there will be an
incentive for others who likewise do not qualify to apply for them as
well-adding to the backlog. As there is no cost to apply and no limit on
the total number of times an individual can apply, there is no incentive
not to apply even if the person is currently working, has no disability, or
is able to work despite his or her disability. 145 As the average benefit
amount of the disability payments alone is over $300,000, and it serves
as a gateway to additional benefits such as Medicaid or Medicare, what
is lost by trying? 146 The odds of winning are astronomically higher than
142.

THE DOORS, The End, on THE DOORS (Elektra Entertainment Group 1967).
143. Paletta, Disability-Claim Judge, supra note 91, at A14.
144. Josh Boak, 117,000 Americans Get Jobless and Disability Benefits, FISCAL TIMES (Sept.
12, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/09/12/117000-Americans-Get-Jobless-and-

Disability-Benefits.aspx.
145.

Beginning July 28, 2011, a claimant who has a claim pending in the Social Security

Administration's administrative review process may not file a new claim of the same benefit type
until the previous claim is adjudicated. There is no prohibition on filing a different type of claim (for
instance, filing a Title XVI claim if there is already a Title II claim) nor any limit on the total
number of claims that may be filed during a person's lifetime. Titles II and XVI: Procedures for
Handling Requests to File Subsequent Applications for Disability Benefits, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,309,
45,309 (July 28, 2011).
146. See Paletta, Insolvency Looms, supra note 4, at A16.
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any lottery, and it does not even cost a dollar to play. As long as
eliminating the hearing backlog is the single, overriding concern of the
Agency, Social Security disability programs will continue awarding
money for nothing.
In the long run, however, the only way to actually reduce the
backlog is to have a program that truly determines the issues of disability
and ability to work on the merits, and does not merely try to process
cases as quickly as possible so that they go away. A Social Security
disability program that is run strictly according to its rules and
regulations, whose goal is accuracy above speed, would deter
unqualified individuals from applying. Why would a person bother
applying if he or she either has no qualifying disability or is able to work
despite a disability if such applicants are never awarded benefits? With
changes making the system more accurate, the backlog would eventually
be eliminated. The proposed five small steps are the first that can be
taken to restore the integrity and legitimacy of our Social Security
disability programs. The Social Security Administration's leadership
will need to determine if they want to have a program that merely
awards disability benefits very quickly, or one that actually does the job
that the American taxpayer pays them to do.
"Ultimately, the taxpaying, voting public will only support needbased welfare programs if they believe that those actually in need of aid
are the ones actually receiving the aid. 1 47 The expectation of the
taxpayers who fund the disability programs is that the decision to grant
benefits will be correct, not just fast. Each disability case which is
improperly paid has huge monetary consequences for the taxpayer: If
merely 10% of all Social Security disability benefits are being
improperly paid, that amounts to more than $17 billion last year alone. 148
Even by government standards, that is real money. Furthermore,
improperly paying disability benefits harms the economy as a whole.
Once awarded disability benefits, individuals will "almost never return
to the active workforce.' 49 Instead they will continue to receive
disability benefits until death or when they become able to collect
retirement benefits instead.1 50 "This is straining already-stretched

147.
148.
149.
note 4.
150.

Swank, Welfare, supra note 15, at 639-40.
See SSDI Program,supra note 20, at 1.
Merline, 5.4 Million Join Disability, supra note 4; Merline, Labor Force Shrinks, supra
Merline, 5.4 Million Join Disability, supra note 4.
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government finances while posing a long-term economic threat by
creating an ever-growing pool of permanently dependent working-age
Americans." 151
Beyond the monetary cost to the taxpayer, the improper payment of
Social Security disability cases undermines the legitimacy and integrity
of the entire system. Improperly paid disability claims stigmatize the
people who properly receive disability benefits, as it calls into question
the validity or degree of their own disability. 15 2 "[T]he fact that some
people cheat the welfare system can lead to suspicion that anyone or
even everyone receiving benefits is likewise cheating, which is clearly
not true."' 153 Also harmed by improperly awarded disability benefits are
those individuals whose attorneys did not cheat. "It is fundamentally
unfair that individuals who intentionally cheat can get benefits, while
those who follow the rules may not."'' 54 The consequences of benefits
being improperly paid are even more dire due to the financial insolvency
of the Social Security disability program. In 2005, the Title II program
55
began spending more money than it brought in through tax receipts.
The Title II trust fund that had been accruing for years is projected to
expire in 2016.156 By improperly paying benefits in the name of backlog
reduction, the leadership of the Social Security Administration harms the
very same people the Agency is supposed to be helping. By taking the
five small steps advocated supra, the Agency leadership can begin the
long journey of restoring the integrity of the Social Security disability
program.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Swank, Welfare, supra note 15, at 638; see Grantham, supra note 4.
Swank, Welfare, supra note 15, at 639.
Id.
Paletta, Insolvency Looms, supra note 4, at A 16.
Faler, supra note 4.
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